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NATURE OF THE CASE

This action, initiated by the Plaintiff-Respondent
in the Court below, sought a Permanent Injunction (Permanent
Restraining Order) which would prevent the Defendant-Appellant
from entering the premises known as Temple Square located in
Salt Lake City, Utah.
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II
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

The Court below after trial granted PlaintiffRespondent' s request for a Permanent Restraining Order.
Said Order enjoined Defendant-Appellant from entering upon
Temple Square, Salt Lake City, Utah in such a manner as to
interfere with, impair or abridge the religious services or
conferences of others.

III
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Defendant-Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment
and an order of dismissal.

IV
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This action was filed in the District Court of the
Third Judicial District in and for the County of Salt Lake
by the Plaintiff-Respondent seeking a Temporary Restraining
Order and a Permanent Injunction against the Defendant-
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Appellant.

Two Temporary Restraining Orders were issued by

the Court, against the Defendant-Appellant.

The Defendant-

Appellant filed an Answer to the Complaint and a Counterclaim
alleging that the initial Temporary Restraining Order was
wrongfully obtained and caused harm to the Defendant-Appellant.
The Court below dismissed the Defendant-Appellant's Counterclaim
for failure to state a cause of action.
affirmed on appeal.

Said dismissal was

The Complaint was brought before the

Court for trial and was heard by the Court August 15, 1977.
The Court below granted the Plaintiff-Respondent's request
for a Permanent Restraining Order against Defendant-Appellant
and said Order was issued August 23, 1977.
The Defendant-Appellant filed a timely notice of
appeal on the issuance of the Permanent Restraining Order.

v
STATEMENT OF FACTS

On April 6, 1976, Defendant-Appellant entered the
premises known as the Tabernacle on Temple Square in Salt
Lake City, Utah during the semi-annual conference of an
unincorporated association known as The Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints, hereinafter, the Church.
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Defendant-Appellant attempted to approach the speaker's
stand at said conference when he was stopped by several
ushers and removed from the building.
In September, 1976 the Plaintiff-Respondent petitioned
the lower Court for a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining
the Defendant-Appellant from entering the above mentioned
Tabernacle during a conference of the Church to be held in
Octobe~

,1976.

The Plaintiff-Respondent also petitioned the

lower Court for a Permanent Injunction prohibiting DefendantAppellant from ever entering the above mentioned Temple
Square.

Plaintiff-Respondent alleged that Defendant-Appellant's

conduct of April 6, 1976 and certain letters of DefendantAppellant indicated Defendant-Appellant was a threat to the
peaceful assembly of worshippers on Temple Square.
The lower Court issued a Temporary Restraining
Order enjoining Defendant-Appellant from entering the Tabernacle
during the October, 1976 conference of the Church.

Defendant-

Appellant was at all times obedient to that Order.
During March of 1977 and directly prior to another
scheduled conference of the Church, the matter of the
Permanent Injunction was still pending.

The Plaintiff-

Respondent requested another Temporary Restraining Order
enjoining Defendant-Appellant from entering Temple Square
during the April, 1977 conference of the Church.

Such an
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Order was issued exparte by the lower Court.

Defendant-

Appellant was at all times obedient to said Order.
The issue of the Permanent Restraining Order or
Permament Injunction came for trial in the lower Court
August 15, 1977 before the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr.,
District Judge.

The lower Court granted Plaintiff-Respondent's

petition and issued a Permanent Restraining Order.

Said

Order reads in part as follows:
. . . that the Defendant be and he is hereby
permanently enjoined from entering upon Temple
Square, Salt Lake City, Utah, during such times
and under such circumstances as to interfere
with, impair or abridge by his conduct, the
religious services or conferences of other
persons or the free exercise of religion by
such other persons therein or thereon; provided
however, that this injunction is neither
intended nor is it to be construed to interfere
with or abridge Defendant's right to free speech
and expression, or Defendant's right to the
free exercise of his religious beliefs at such
other times and places, or under such other
circumstances as to not interfere with the
constitutionally protected rights to the free
exercise of religion of and by other persons, . . .

VI
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE
CORPORATE PLAINTIFF IN THE ACTION AT ISSUE HAD STANDING AND
WAS A PROPER PARTY IN INTEREST.
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It has long been a basic underlying principle of
Anglo-American law that a civil action may be prosecuted
only by a party having a real interest in the determination
of the suit.

This concept is embodied by lltah Statute in

Rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

This rule

states in part, "Every action shall be prosecuted in the
name of the real party in interest."
The purpose for this requirement of interest on
the part of civil plaintiffs has been clarified by the Utah
Supreme Court:
The reason the defendant has the right to a
cause of action prosecuted by the real party
in interest is so that the judgment will preclude
any action on the same demand by another and
permit the defendant to assert all defenses or
counterclaims available against the real owner
of the cause. Shaw v. Jepnson, 121 Utah 155,
239 P. 2d 745 (1952).
In the instant case, action was brought not by the
true parties in interest but by the Plaintiff, a corporate
sole known as the Corporation of the President of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints.

This corporate entity

exists solely for the purpose of handling the financial and
property affairs of the unincorporated association known as
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints.

According

to testimony adduced at trial, the purpose of the Plaintiff
is to deal with the Church's estate.

The purpose of the
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Plaintiff is not to worship.

However, the Plaintiff alleged

in its petitions for a Permanent Restraining Order against
the Defendant that the injury Defendant would cause if not
enjoined was an injury to the rights of certain parties to
freely assemble and practice their religion.

The Plaintiff

has alleged that Defennant's conduct of April 6, 1976 and
certain letters written by Defendant and entered in evidence
by Plaintiff indicate the Defendant will, if not enjoined,
disrupt the worship services held by the Church and known as
general conferences.

The Plaintiff has alleged these con-

ferences are attended by thousands of members of the Church
and are broadcast world wide to other Church members.
Hence, the Plaintiff has revealed the true parties in interest
in the present action.

The true parties in interest are the

Church itself and the individual worshippers, members of the
Church.

Since the Plaintiff does not deal with ecclesiastical

affairs of the Church it cannot have any legal interest in
the worship services of the Church.

Moreover, since the

Plaintiff corporate sole consists of only one person, it
cannot be found that the Plaintiff is in any way representative
of all parties in interest in the present case.
In addition, the Plaintiff is not the proper party
in interest to bring even an action concerning the trespass
issues which may be involved in the instant case.

The
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general rule of law is that a party in

~ossession

of real

property has the exclusive right of action for injuries
affecting the possession.

Bowe v. Palmer, 36 rtah 214, 102

P. 1007 (1909); 49 Am Jur. 2d

L/~

§281 (1964).

A landlord/

owner's right of action is linited to protection of his
reversionary interest.

~iller

v.

Ediso~

Electric Illu:ninating

Co. of New York, 184 NY 17, 76

~

734 (1906); Am Jur. 2d

L/T §86 (1964).
In the instant case, Temple Square is owned by the
Plaintiff, a corporate sole.

The Plaintiff does not personally

occupy Temple Square, but "leases" the premises to the unincorporated association, the Church.
sive possession of Temple Square.

The Church is in excluUnder law, the

C~urch

and

not the Plaintiff has exclusive right of action for trespass
to Temple Square, both action for damages caused by trespass
and for injunctive relief to prevent future trespasses.
Hence the proper party of interest to institute the present
action, even as it may pertain to property interests in
Temple Square, is not the Plaintiff but the Church.
Thus, the lower Court's decision should be reversed for four reasons:

1)

T~e

decision violates

~tah

Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 17(a) by granting the Plaintiff
standing to bring their action.

The decision also denies
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the Defendant the rights established in Jeppson, supra, in
t~at;

2)

other actions on the same demand may be brought by

ether parties at a later time, and 3)

the Defendant is

denied the opportunity of asserting the defenses and counterclaim
he may have against the true parties in interest, the Church
and its members; 4)

the Plaintiff is not the proper party

in interest to bring any action regarding trespass to Temple
Square since the Plaintiff is an owner/landlord who is not
in possession of Temple Sauare and was not in possession of
Temple Square at any time during which the alleged injurious
conduct of Defendant occurred.

POINT II

THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A PE~~NT RESTRAINING
ORDER IN THAT THERE WERE ADEQUATE REMEDIES AT LAW TO PROTECT
THE PLAINTIFF FROM THE ALLEGED HAR."i TO BE CAUSED BY DEFENDANT.
A permanent restraining order or permanent injunction is an extraordinary writ which the courts issue only
when all legal remedies are inadequate to afford the Plaintiff relief.
Generally, equity will protect personal
rights by injunction upon the same ~onditions
on which it will protect property rights • . .
that is, where a substantial right of Plaintiff
will be injured in a material degree unless
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relief is granted, (and) the remedy at law
is inadequate, . . . 43A C. J. S. Inj un. § 140,
(1948) (emphasis added)
In the instant case, Plaintiff has sufficient
remedies at law to guard against any alleged potential harm
by the Defendant such that issuance of the Permanent Restraining
Order by the lower Court was error.
The Plaintiff has alleged that, if not enjoined,
Defendant will enter Temple Square during the Church's semiannual conference worship services and will disrupt said
conferences.

The Plaintiff has two legal remedies for such

alleged harm.

First, the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake

City, Utah afford Plaintiff a legal remedy.

Section 32-1-13

of said Ordinances states:
It shall be unlawful for any person to
disturb a public assembly, congregated for
religious or other lawful purposes, within
the limits of Salt Lake City, by undue noise,
or by offensive, unbecoming or indecent
behavior.
Second, the Plaintiff has a remedy at law for any
alleged potential harm of the Defendant through an action
for trespass.

Section 32-3-3(1) of the Revised Ordinances

of Salt Lake City, Utah states in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person to . . ·
ride, drive, walk, lodge, or camp or sleep
upon the premises of another without the permission of the owner or occupant thereof.
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The Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides in 76-6206:
(1)

~or

(2)

A person is guilty of criminal trespass
if • . . .
(a) He enters or remains unlawfully on
property and:
~i~
Intends to cause annoyance or
inJury to any person thereon or
damage to any property thereon;
(b) Knowing his entry or presence is
unlawful, he enters or remains on property
as to which notice against entering is
given by:
(i) Personal communication to the
actor by the owner or someone with
apparent authority to act for the
owner; or
(ii) Fencing or other enclosure obviously
designed to exclude intruders; or
(iii) Posting of signs reasonably
likely to come to the attention of
intruders.

pu1:poses of this section "enter" means
intrusion of the entire body.

According to the findings of the lower Court Plaintiff is
the lawful owner of Temple Square.

Hence, the Plaintiff has

a legal remedy for trespass any time the Defendant should
enter Temple Square without the permission of Plaintiff.

POINT III

THE FINDINGS OF FACT ADOPTED BY THE COURT BELOW DO
NOT SUPPORT THE ORDER OF THE LOWER COURT AND ARE INADEQUATE
AS A MATTER OF LAW.
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If the Court is to enjoin the Defendant from the
future acts disruptive of worship services on Temple Square
the lower Court must make a finding of fact that the Defendant
will in the future disrupt worship services on Temple Square.
Anderson v. Jensen, 71 U. 295,296 P. 745, (1948).

At the

very least the Court should be required to find a reasonable
possibility that the Defendant will disrupt future worship
services.

It is not logical for a Court to enjoin the

Defendant from committing certain acts if there is little or
no possibility of the acts ever occuring.
The lower Court has made no findings of fact that
the Defendant will or even possibly will disrupt future
worship services on Temple Square.

The Court has found

merely that the Defendant entered Temple Square on April 6,
1976 in an attempt to disrupt the general conference of the
Church and that the Defendant has made various threats
concerning ecclesiastical trials of certain leaders of the
Church.

The lower Court has made no finding of fact that

the Defendant will or has any intention to make good these
threats.

Hence, the Court erred in issuing the Permanent

Restraining Order in that there were insufficient findings
of fact to support issuance of the Order.
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POINT IV

THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE LOWER COURT ARE NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE TESTIMONY ADDUCED AT TRIAL.

The Court below in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law made the following findings in paragraph 6
concerning the events of April 6, 1976:
. . . that the Defendant and his two associates
were blocked from proceeding through one avenue
to the podium and commenced across the front
aisle of the Tabernacle; that Defendant pushed
an usher aside who stood in his way requesting
if he could be of help; the Defendant stated
in substance, "Don't try to stop the Lord;"
that thereafter two security personnel took
hold of Defendant and turned him around, the
Defendant stating in substance, "Don't touch me,
I'm the Lord;" that the Defendant was escorted
from the Tabernacle by said security personnel, ...
These findings are in direct conflict with testimony
produced at trial.

On page 176 of the trial record the

Defendant's testimony is as follows:

Q. With respect to your entrance into the
Tabernacle, you were intent on getting to the
podium I take it, from the fact that you
struck aside an usher; is that correct?
1

A.

I did not strike aside an usher.

Q.

You heard the testimony of Mr. Truitt?

A.

I take exception to the testimony.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20

Q.

All right.
Is it your testimony now under
oath that you did not brush him aside and cause
him to stumble?
A. Mr. Truitt's hand came out at me and I
pushed it aside as being an effort t~ restrain
me.

Q.

And what did you say to Mr. Truitt?

A.
I think my words were, "Get out of my
way."

Q.

You heard his testimony that you said,
"Don't stop me.
I'm the lord"?

A.

This is what he said.

Q.

That was not your testimony?

A.

That was not my statement.

It is inappropriate for a Court to make a findi

I

I

I

of fact where there is directly conflicting testimony and

----------

----------------

the lower Court erred in making the findings included in
paragraph 6 of the Findings of Fact.
In addition, the Court erred in failing to find as
fact that the Defendant corresponded with the President of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints for the

-

purpose of discussing his exconununication from said church

~~-~~------

and an ecclesiastical trial to be held ~f le~ders

of

~1
I

said

the doctrines of said church gave him a right to initiate
such a trial.

Uncontradicted testimony and other evidence

1

I

,

church for alleged misconduct and that the Defendant believe ]',~
i

!
!

,

~
~

I~
•\
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was produced at trial to support such findings of fact.

It

was error for the lower Court to omit such uncontradicted
information from its findings of fact.

POINT V

THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN TAKING JURISDICTION OF A
PURELY RELIGIOUS DISPUTE AND ALLOWED THE PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT
BY AND THROUGH THE CIVIL COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH TO
SUPPRESS THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOMS AND RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES OF
THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
All of the events, alleged injuries and alleged
potential injuries surrounding the litigation which has led
to the issuance of the Permanent Restraining Order involve
an ecclesiastical dispute between the Plaintifr and the
Defendant.

The Defendant claims a religious belief that the

doctrine of his church allows him to bring certain leaders
of the church to church trial for alleged malfeasance in
office.

The Plaintiff claims on the other hand that the

Defendant's efforts to exercise this doctrinal belief constitute
an infringement of Plaintiff's rights to exercise his religion.
The dispute is, in short, an intra-church dispute over
authority within the Church.
The lower Court erred by taking cognizance of this
intra-church dispute at all.

The Courts are estopped by
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constitutional fiat and unanimous court precedents from
determining any and all matters of church discipline, faith,
rule, custom or law.

The landmark United States Supreme

Court case of Watson v. Jones, established this rule.

The

Watson court stated:
The right to organize voluntary religious
associates to assist in the expression and dissemination of any religious doctrine, and to
create tribunals for the decision of controverted
questions of faith within the association,
and for the ecclesiastical government of all
the individual members, congregations, and
officers within the general association, is
unquestioned. All who unite themselves to
uch a body do so~~ to
t is go
, and are oun
o su mi to
it.
Bilt i t would be-avainConsent and woutd
lead to 'flre:-rotal sub~ religi6Us
bbdit::~ an~~:~mgneved by one of their
decisions co_ll!<:!_a~ to _th~ secular courts
ana ~em reversed. It is of the essence
oft~~~-'--~
tb---esta1rlrstrirt1rur1a ls for the dec-i s ion of
q~--ar±-s-i-n~ramongthemse-lves;---

that

thOS'e decisions should be_bj.Yfcring :[n all
c~ses of eeclesiasticalcogg__i~Clnce, subject
o!\:lY to such appeals as __!!i.~<!_r:lism irsetf
~rOVl.des ror.
N"Qi_@__N.~ that JUSflce w~ to ~ornotea -~ul:rnri-rti?!g
t se ec sions to re ·
n he~
j-1.ldicrar-tr una s. Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall
67~ Ed. 666 E-l-872).
Other authorities supporting the view that civil
courts will not review acts of church discipline or member
expulsion include 66 Am. Jur. 2d p. 781-787; 70 ALR 71-90;
and 20 ALR 2d 421-522.

A recent case supporting this view
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is Simpson v. Wells Lamont Corporation, 484 F. 2d 490 (1974).
There is no way that a Court can rule on the
instant case without making a decision concerning church
doctrine.

If the lower Court is sustained the Courts will

have decided that under church doctrine the Defendant does
not have the right to present grievances to the general
conference of his church regarding malfeasance of the church's
leaders.

If the Court rules in favor of the Defendant, the

Court will have determined that the Defendant does have such
a right.

Since the Court cannot rule for either party

without making a secular decision of religious doctrine, the
lower Court erred in taking cognizance of the case at all
and the lower Court should be reversed and the case dismissed.

POINT VI

THE ORDER ISSUED BY THE COURT BELOW IS SO VAGUE AS
TO VIOLATE THE TERMS OF RULE 65 A(d) OF THE UTAH RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65 A(d) states in
part:
Every ~rder granting an injunct~on and every
restraining order shall be specif7c in terms;
shall describe in reasonable detail, and not
by reference to the complaint or other do~u
ment, the act or acts sought to be restrained; ...
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The Permanent Restraining Order granted the Plaintiff by the lower Court violates Rule 65 A(d) in its failure
to describe in reasonable detail the act or acts sought to
be restrained.

The Defendant is prohibited from entering

Temple Square in such a manner as to "interfere with, impair
or abridge by his conduct, the religious services or conferences
of other persons . . . . "

The Court does not, however,

clarify just what conduct it deems to interfere with, impair
or abridge religious services.

The Order continues on to

provide that the Order is not to be construed to interfere
with or abridge Defendant's rights to free speech, religion
and assembly.

The Court does not clarify how the Order is

to be construed when the religious convictions of the Defendant
conflict with those of other worshippers on Temple Square.
The Order does not even clarify whether or not the past
conduct of Defendant which precipitated the present action
would, if repeated, constitute a violation of the Order.
The Permanent Restraining Order is so vague as to
be useless.

It affords neither the Plaintiff, the Defendant

nor future tribunals any concrete information as to what
constitutes a violation of the Order.

For this reason the

lower Court should be reversed.
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CONCLUSION

The Court below erred in issuing the Permanent
Restraining Order.

The Court erred in allowing the Plain-

tiff to have standing to bring action.

The Court erred in

granting the Order when the Plaintiff had adequate remedies
at law to protect it from the alleged harm.

The Court erred

in making its findings of fact and in holding that these
findings of fact supported the Order.

The Court erred in

taking jurisdiction of a religious dispute and in issuing an
order so vague in its terms as to violate Rule 65 A(d) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The lower Court decision

should be reversed and the matter dismissed.
Respectfully submitted,
DOUGLAS A. WALLACE
Defendant-Appellant Pro Se
P.O. Box 1671
Vancouver, Washington 98665
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